Ukraine’s rapeseed meal export may become challenging in 2026/27 — ASAP Agri
While exports from Ukraine’s deep-water ports have almost stopped for now amid the latest escalation, we hope this disruption will be temporary and continue to assess Ukraine’s 2026/27 rapeseed meal export outlook under a gradual recovery scenario, says Kateryna Mudriian, Chief Oilseed Analyst at ASAP Agri.
Ukraine has the potential to remain a sizeable rapeseed meal producer in 2026/27 MY, but the key question for the new season is where this volume will be placed.
Despite a winterkill, ASAP Agri expects Ukraine’s 2026/27 MY rapeseed crop to increase by 12% y/y to 3.7 MMT thanks to higher yields in the South. Under our scenario, domestic crush may keep rapeseed meal production near last year's level of 760 KMT.
This means Ukraine may enter the new season with a similar export task. In July–May 2025/26, Ukrainian rapeseed meal exports expanded sharply to 552 KMT, compared with 219 KMT in the same period of 2024/25 MY. China became the largest destination, taking around 256 KMT, followed by the EU, Turkey and Israel.
However, the market setup for 2026/27 MY may be more complicated. The destinations that helped absorb Ukrainian rapeseed meal in 2025/26 MY may not be as easy in the new season.
China: the largest outlet, but also the biggest uncertainty
China became the key buyer of Ukrainian rapeseed meal in 2025/26 MY after trade restrictions reduced the competitiveness of Canadian canola products in the Chinese market. As Canada lost part of its traditional outlet, Chinese buyers diversified purchases, opening room for Ukraine, russia, the UAE and other suppliers.
This helped Ukraine sharply increase sales to China. But this window may narrow in 2026/27 MY. China and Canada have softened trade conditions, and Canadian canola meal may become more competitive again, especially in the first half of the season. If Canadian flows recover, Chinese buyers may have less need to rely on alternative origins, including Ukraine.
Additional uncertainty comes from possible new registration requirements. Market rumours suggest that Ukrainian rapeseed meal plants may need a MARA import registration certificate in addition to the GACC approval used before. If confirmed, this could slow new sales to China at a sensitive moment, just as competition from Canada may be returning.
Australia also remains a factor. If China expands imports of Australian canola seed, more seed could be crushed domestically, increasing local rapeseed meal availability and reducing demand for imported meal.
Turkey: local crop may reduce import need
Turkey is another risk for Ukrainian exporters. In 2025/26 MY, Turkey became a meaningful outlet for Ukrainian rapeseed meal, with shipments rising to around 83 KMT in July–May, compared with only about 7 KMT a year earlier.
But the new season may be different. While USDA’s official balance keeps Turkey’s rapeseed crop at around 150 KMT, market participants expect production could double year-on-year after farmers in Thrace increased rapeseed area following drought losses in sunflower.
“WASDE’s figure is definitely out of reality, as we expect Turkey’s 2026/27 rapeseed crop to reach at least 300 KMT and possibly as much as 350 KMT,” said Sina Arıker, trader at Bunge Turkey.
If confirmed, the larger crop could significantly increase local rapeseed meal availability. USDA currently forecasts Turkish rapeseed meal production at around 84 KMT, while market expectations point to roughly twice that level.
“This could result in around 170 KMT of rapeseed meal production in Turkey, increasing domestic supply and reducing import needs,” said Salih Karagöz, broker at Atria Brokers.
Price signals already look challenging: local rapeseed meal in Turkey’s Thrace region is priced around 235 USD/MT last week, while Ukrainian offers are closer to 245 USD/MT CIF Marmara.
“There are a few more bearish factors for rapeseed meal in the coming months,” said Irina Dursun, trader at Sunar Yatırım. “Barley is currently relatively cheap in Turkey, which is slowing compound feed sales. In addition, heavy rains have supported pasture availability, so livestock have more grass to consume. This has already put strong pressure on wheat bran prices, and we expect similar pressure to emerge in the meal segment as well.”
This makes import parity unattractive unless Ukrainian sellers lower price ideas or local supply tightens.
Turkey may also become more visible as a regional seller. Already, Turkish suppliers started offering rapeseed meal on FOB or CIF basis, adding competition for Ukrainian origin in nearby Mediterranean markets.
EU: the market that could help absorb Ukrainian volume
The EU may become the key balancing outlet for Ukrainian rapeseed meal in 2026/27 MY.
In 2024/25 MY, Ukraine was the leading supplier of rapeseed meal to the EU, accounting for around 45% of the bloc’s imports. But in 2025/26 MY, the structure changed sharply. As Canadian meal lost competitiveness in China, Canada redirected more product to Europe and supplied nearly 70% of EU rapeseed meal imports, while Ukraine’s share fell to around 12%.
This flow may partly reverse in the 2026/27 MY. If Canadian canola meal returns to China under softer tariff conditions, Canada may have less pressure to sell aggressively into the EU. This could reopen room for Ukrainian origin.
Still, the EU will not be an easy replacement market. Buyers remain price-sensitive, and Ukraine will have to compete with Canadian and other origins on price, freight, quality and sustainability requirements.
Outlook
The 2026/27 season may start more difficult for Ukrainian rapeseed meal than the previous one. Ukraine is likely to have enough exportable supply, but the main outlets look less secure.
China may become harder because of Canadian competition and possible MARA registration requirements. Turkey may buy less because of higher local supply and weak import parity. The EU could help absorb part of the volume, but only if Ukrainian offers are competitive and Canadian flows shift back toward China.
For Ukrainian exporters, the new season may therefore be less about production and more about market access, timing and price flexibility.