Grain stuck inland: Cezar Gheorghe on the bottlenecks behind Constanța’s busy terminals
A grain terminal can have empty railway tracks while trains carrying its cargo wait inland for weeks. That is the contradiction Cezar Gheorghe describes in Romania today: Constanța continues to operate, but getting grain to the port has become a bottleneck.
A large Romanian harvest, low Danube water levels, railway works and a shortage of locomotives are putting pressure on routes that also carry Ukrainian grain. For farmers, delayed deliveries can mean delayed payments — even when market prices are rising.
In an interview with Latifundist.com, the Romanian grain market analyst explains how terminals decide which cargo to receive, whether shipping through Constanța can save Ukrainian exporters money, and why he believes buffer storage should be built closer to the border. He also discusses alternatives through Galați and Brăila and what Romania’s experience of joining the EU could teach Ukrainian agriculture.
Latifundist.com: Before we discuss the current situation, could you briefly introduce your background in agribusiness?
Cezar Gheorghe: I have been in agribusiness for 25 years. I spent almost 20 years working with multinational companies, including nine and a half years at Cargill, as well as Bunge and Ameropa. I also worked with Agricover, a major Romanian group. That experience has given me an understanding of how the business works across the supply chain.
Constanța is operating. Why can’t the grain reach the port?
Latifundist.com: What has changed at Constanța since the incidents near Sulina on October 14–15? Are vessels and terminals operating normally, and have you seen any changes in insurance costs?
Cezar Gheorghe: First, we need to consider where these incidents happened and their distance from the shore. There is a distinction between territorial waters, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone.
Until now, we had seen attacks on vessels in the exclusive economic zone. The incident involving a vessel in Romanian territorial waters near Sulina raises further questions. At the time we are speaking, my understanding is that the Romanian authorities have not clarified whether it was a drone strike or an explosion on board.
My suspicion is that the authorities may be reluctant to acknowledge an attack in territorial waters because that would have wider implications, including for NATO.
But in terms of operations, nothing has changed in the daily running of Constanța. Vessels are arriving and departing according to their schedules. The terminals continue to operate. Nobody has stopped working.
Insurance conditions are broadly the same for these operations, although insurers have increased their assessment of risk in the open-sea area of the Black Sea. Crossing that area carries a higher risk than following the coastal route from Turkey through Bulgarian and Romanian waters.
Operations in Constanța remain unchanged, perhaps with some additional insurance costs for vessels.
Latifundist.com: Are vessels still taking the direct route across the Black Sea to Constanța?
Cezar Gheorghe: Yes. Vessels sailing from the Bosphorus to Constanța still take the direct route.
Their destinations can be seen on vessel-tracking services such as MarineTraffic. The assumption under which Constanța has been operating is that vessels heading to the port will not be targeted because Romania is not a party to the conflict.
Latifundist.com: The port authority says Constanța is operating normally, while transport operators report delays and losses. How can both be true? Where are the main bottlenecks?
Cezar Gheorghe: We need to distinguish between what happens inside the port and what happens inland.
Romania suffered from low water levels on the Danube throughout the summer. The situation was so serious that we were forced to shut down the nuclear power plant at Cernavodă.
Barge deliveries along a large part of the Romanian stretch of the Danube had to stop. Those shipments moved to rail and road, creating a shortage of available transport. Everybody wanted to deliver by truck or train.
On top of that, Romania has an exceptionally large harvest this season. For the five main commodities — wheat, barley, rapeseed, maize and sunflower seed — we are looking at at least 31.5 million tonnes. Harvesting is still underway.
Romania’s licensed storage capacity is no more than 16.5 million tonnes. We have a licensing system that certifies whether a facility is suitable for storing grain. That licensed capacity is roughly half the size of this year’s harvest. We have goods coming out of the fields with nowhere to put them.
At the same time, major railway infrastructure works are underway. We had not expected Odesa to be blocked this summer. There are substantial works around Fetești and at Palas, close to Constanța, and these create bottlenecks.
We have effectively turned rail wagons into silos on wheels. Delivery delays can reach 40–50 days. Imagine grain sitting in wagons for that long before it can be delivered.
There is another problem: we have rail wagons, but not enough locomotives. We lack the traction capacity needed to move all the trains.
When a train is held up, its locomotive may be reassigned to another train. Then, when the first train finally receives permission to move, there may be no locomotive available to take it forward.
Latifundist.com: So a terminal can have capacity available while the trains carrying its cargo are stuck inland?
Cezar Gheorghe: A few days ago, I visited a terminal in Constanța that I consider the most modern in Europe. It has a loading capacity of 75,000 tonnes in 24 hours. Yet its railway tracks were empty: there were no trains there to unload. Around 12–14 trains were waiting to reach it, but the terminal did not know when they would arrive.
We have a large Romanian harvest, limited storage, domestic transport bottlenecks and Ukrainian cargo coming through the northern border crossings or via Giurgiulești. All these flows are trying to reach Constanța.
When the port authority talks about operations, it is referring to the terminals themselves. Their operational performance has been very strong. Since July 1, they have handled 9.5 million tonnes or more, while the grain terminals have around 2 million tonnes of storage capacity.
That means they have turned over their storage capacity more than four and a half times in approximately three and a half months. That is a significant achievement. The main problems are inland.
Grain isn’t moving — and neither is the money
Latifundist.com: How are these transport and storage problems affecting payments to farmers?
Cezar Gheorghe: There is another issue we need to address. Over the past two years, we have had cases involving local traders who collect grain from small farmers, aggregate it in silos and sell it to exporters.
Some bought grain at high prices and financed their stocks with expensive bank loans. When prices failed to rise, they could not repay the banks. If they sold the grain and received payment into their accounts, the banks would take the money to recover the loans.
In some cases, farmers were left unpaid. Exporters also suffered losses: they had paid for grain against warehouse receipts, but when they tried to collect it, the goods were not there. Some cases involved 30,000–40,000 tonnes. As a result, exporters became unwilling to pay against warehouse receipts.
This also affects farmers with their own silos and legitimate aggregators who have met their obligations. Their grain is in storage, but transport bottlenecks prevent delivery. They cannot receive payment because buyers are no longer willing to pay against a warehouse receipt.
That is the cycle we are dealing with: the goods cannot move, and the money cannot move either.
Latifundist.com: Romania has a large harvest and higher wheat prices, yet farmers are struggling to deliver. Are they able to benefit from this market, and how long could the opportunity last?
Cezar Gheorghe: I would call it “a failure through success”. We have been successful in producing a large crop, but we are struggling to move it.
There is another point I regularly make to Romanian farmers: the escalation of the war between Russia and Ukraine has pushed prices higher, giving them an opportunity to sell. Wheat started at around €195 per tonne and is now at €242 for 12% protein. That is an increase of approximately €45–47 per tonne.
But this opportunity will not necessarily last. Australia and Argentina will soon begin harvesting. Canada also has a large crop of good quality. New supplies, including those from the Southern Hemisphere, will help fill the gap left by reduced exports from Ukraine and Russia. It is a race against the clock to sell and deliver.
The problem is that Ukrainian farmers are not benefiting from this in the same way as traders. We see a similar situation in Romania: logistics problems limit what farmers receive, while traders benefit.
From my perspective, this is even more pronounced in Ukraine, where traders can buy grain at low farm-gate prices. Contacts in Ukraine told me that, at the beginning of the harvest, wheat was being bought for around $70 per tonne at the farm gate. If you then allow, say, $120 per tonne for logistics, the difference between those costs and the selling price becomes the trader’s margin. Ultimately, these problems fall on the farmer’s shoulders.
Ukrainian and Romanian cargo: who gets priority?
Latifundist.com: How much Ukrainian grain has actually been shipped through Constanța this season, and where do Ukrainian and Romanian cargo flows compete most directly for transport?
Cezar Gheorghe: As of today, around 800,000 tonnes of Ukrainian grain have been shipped through Constanța, mainly wheat and barley. That figure covers cargo that has already departed. We cannot include goods that are still on their way.
There is also a flow through the northern border route that affects transport availability. A Romanian investor built a terminal on the Ukrainian side of the border in 2024, allowing grain to be transferred from Ukrainian wagons to Romanian wagons because the railway gauges differ.
The competition for transport is most visible in northern Romania, in the Romanian region of Moldova. There are large farms there with grain sitting in their silos, while trains carrying Ukrainian cargo travel to Constanța.
Elsewhere, the main problems are the transport bottlenecks themselves: insufficient transport capacity, too few locomotives, wagons held up along the route, and infrastructure works on key railway sections.
Latifundist.com: You have mentioned plans for ten train pairs a day carrying Ukrainian cargo to Constanța. How does that compare with the port’s rail unloading capacity?
Cezar Gheorghe: The investor has committed to organising ten train pairs a day carrying Ukrainian cargo to Constanța.
The port terminals can unload a maximum of 25 train pairs per day. If ten of those are carrying Ukrainian goods, that represents 40% of the rail unloading capacity.
The impact would be particularly noticeable for farmers in northern Romania, where these cargo flows compete for transport.
Latifundist.com: Unicom Tranzit said some terminals were receiving Romanian cargo before Ukrainian cargo. Does this reflect a preference for Romanian grain, or is the order determined by vessel schedules?
Cezar Gheorghe: From my perspective, the order is determined by operational requirements. Space in Constanța is limited. A port terminal is a facility for moving grain through, not for keeping it in long-term storage.
The terminal has to work according to the vessel schedule. Ships may have been scheduled 30 or 40 days in advance. If a vessel is coming to load grain of one origin, the terminal cannot fill its available space with grain of another origin.
If a ship is scheduled to load Ukrainian grain, the terminal receives Ukrainian grain. If it is scheduled to load Romanian grain, it receives Romanian grain.
The Ukrainian flows we are discussing only started arriving from August 1. I think those making these claims may not have the full picture of the terminals’ schedules.
I spent two years as general manager of Chimpex, the largest terminal in Constanța, which belongs to the Ameropa Group. I know how these operations work.
If cargo does not fit the vessel schedule, I cannot receive it, regardless of where it comes from. Accepting that cargo would occupy the storage space needed for a scheduled vessel.
That is what determines the order: the vessel line-up.
Latifundist.com: In August, you warned of a potential capacity shortfall at Constanța. Do you still expect that pressure to last throughout the season, or will it ease as Romania ships more of its own crop?
Cezar Gheorghe: My assumption at the time was that almost all Ukrainian cargo would come through Romania. Since then, Romania has already moved a substantial volume of its own exports.
Romanian exports so far are roughly 8.5–8.7 million tonnes, perhaps slightly more. Our total export potential for the season is around 21–22 million tonnes.
Not all of that will go through Constanța. Some goods will travel west by rail or truck, while others will cross the Danube into Bulgaria for processing. Yes, there is a shortage of space, and demand is exceeding capacity at the moment. But there is still a long time until the season ends on June 30.
Take wheat as an example. Romania has an export potential of 9 million tonnes this season, and we have already exported 4.5 million tonnes — half of that volume. I strongly believe we could finish exporting our wheat surplus by February or March. So it is a matter of flexibility and logistics.
Latifundist.com: Would buffer storage help Ukrainian exporters? Should it be built in Constanța or closer to the border?
Cezar Gheorghe: I hear Ukrainian companies saying there is no buffer storage space for their grain in Constanța. But nobody is going to build that kind of storage inside the port. Constanța is there to handle grain and move it through.
It would make more sense to identify seven or eight locations near the entry points into Romania, where Ukrainian commodities could be held as buffer stocks under appropriate customs arrangements. That would help.
What we see now is everyone trying to push goods forward, but there are not enough available wagons or trucks. Even Moldova allocating 50% of its wagons to Ukraine does not solve the problem.
Border crossings also have limited capacity. When hundreds of trucks arrive, they cannot all cross immediately. Customs clearance takes time. Documents have to be presented and checked.
Goods entering Romania in transit must also comply with transit procedures, and the necessary paperwork has to be completed with the exporter.
It is a matter of logistics and space, not bad intentions. Of course, people are unhappy with the delays.
Lower freight rates and alternative ports: where are the savings?
Latifundist.com: Atria Brokers estimated that shipping grain from Ukraine’s Danube ports to Egypt could cost around $115–120 per tonne, including waiting time. What are the freight and handling costs via Constanța, and does the lower sea freight rate necessarily make this route cheaper for Ukrainian grain?
Cezar Gheorghe: I can give you the freight rate from Constanța and the handling tariffs at the port. Shipping from the Ukrainian Danube ports to Egypt can cost around $120–130 per tonne. Water depth is an important factor: you cannot load vessels there as large as those you can load in Constanța.
Today, the freight rate from Constanța to Egypt is $22.50 per tonne. Handling in Constanța costs roughly €7.50–9 per tonne, or up to €10, depending on the commodity. So there is a substantial difference.
But getting Ukrainian grain to Constanța also costs money. I am not sure that, once you include that cost, this route would necessarily give Ukrainian sellers a better return. I am not a specialist in that part of the calculation. The goods can arrive by truck, rail or barge, and the cost also depends on where the grain comes from.
Latifundist.com: Could Galați and Brăila offer a practical alternative for Ukrainian grain? What would make cooperation with these ports more sustainable?
Cezar Gheorghe: My advice is to use Galați and Brăila. These ports can handle grain, traffic is not particularly heavy, and the passage to Sulina is much quicker from there. They have loading capacity available. These are options worth considering.
But I also remember visiting Galați, Brăila and Tulcea in 2022–2023 with representatives of your government. They were enthusiastic about what they saw. Then, when Odesa reopened, they flew away like birds.
The Romanian side had made investments, but those partners disappeared. That was not the response the people in Galați and Brăila had expected.
This is my personal opinion: if you make a commitment, keep it. Keeping commitments builds trust on both sides.
Joining the EU: costs, restrictions and lessons for Ukraine
Latifundist.com: Looking beyond logistics, how could joining the EU change the competitiveness of Ukrainian agriculture?
Cezar Gheorghe: Romania is part of the EU, so we follow rules and regulations governing how we grow crops. These affect production costs and, in my view, the quality and value of Romanian commodities compared with Ukrainian ones.
I hear people saying that once Ukraine joins the EU, everything in agriculture will be milk and honey. It will not be that simple.
You will have to comply with rules and restrictions that can limit your production potential and increase input costs per hectare. That could reduce some of the competitiveness you have today, when you have greater freedom to choose which products you use on your crops.
Latifundist.com: Ukrainian agricultural associations are asking for a transition period of around ten years. Based on your experience of Romania’s accession, is that a reasonable timeframe, and what makes the adjustment so difficult?
Cezar Gheorghe: I can understand that. Between 2002 and 2007, when Romania joined the EU, I was involved in adapting Romanian agriculture to EU food and feed safety requirements.
For me personally, leading that process was a nightmare. There were so many rules, requirements and details to work through. The annex alone to the basic food and feed safety legislation ran to 800 pages. I did not fully realise what I was getting into, but once I had started, I had to see it through.
You mention ten years. Perhaps that is the right approach, because this is a long process. Ukraine is a large country. This needs to be handled by people with considerable experience and expertise. It is not an easy task. I do not want to go into every detail, but there are many of them, and the devil is in the details.
Latifundist.com: You have said that farmers carry much of the cost while other parts of the supply chain work for profit. How can farmers gain more control over storage, transport and sales?
Cezar Gheorghe: At the end of the day, logistics companies, port terminals and traders are all working for profit. Meanwhile, farmers need to survive. They are the weakest link in the chain. It is the same in Romania.
Farmers receive the least while facing high costs for fertiliser, fuel and logistics. But farmers are also reluctant to join forces. They complain, yet they do not want to work together in associations.
In Romania and Ukraine, we have what I call “new money”. In Western Europe and across the Atlantic, there is “old money” — assets and businesses passed down through generations.
Both Romania and Ukraine came out of the communist period. We had a curtain in front of us, separating us from what was developing elsewhere.
In the United States and Western Europe, some farms have been in the same families for seven, eight or nine generations. They know how to organise themselves into cooperatives and businesses that work together.
Take an example from France. There is a cooperative with its own export terminal, a trading company, a fleet of 500 trucks, a silo network and its own laboratories. Having its own laboratories means it does not have to rely entirely on other people’s assessments. It also has shops offering a wide range of goods. That is what working together can achieve.
Sofiia Yaroshenko, Latifundist.com
