Putin Threatens to “Cut Ukraine Off From the Sea.” What Port Operators, Traders, and Agroholdings Say

In late November and early December, four vessels transporting Russian products were already hit. On November 28, two sanctioned tankers — Kairos and Virat — caught fire in the Black Sea near Turkey’s coast. On December 2, the Turkish oil tanker Mersin was attacked by a UAV near the shores of Senegal. That same day, in the Black Sea, the tanker Midvolga-2, carrying sunflower oil from Russia to Georgia, was also attacked.

On December 2, the Turkish company Besiktas Shipping, owner of Mersin, officially announced an immediate halt to all operations connected with Russia and the transport of Russian oil. The company emphasized that it had always complied with international sanctions regimes, including the G7/EU price cap mechanism, and now considers cooperation with Russia “unacceptable” due to escalating risks.

Later the same day, the Russian dictator declared:

“If attacks on our tankers continue, we will be forced to consider vessels belonging to countries that assist Ukraine as legitimate targets. Including tankers entering Ukrainian ports.”

With this statement, the Kremlin is effectively blackmailing foreign shipowners working with Ukrainian cargoes, including agricultural products.

Despite Putin’s threats, Russia has already attacked foreign vessels in Ukrainian ports. On November 17, 2025, Russian forces struck port infrastructure in Odesa region, damaging the Turkish vessel Orinda, which had 4,000 tons of liquefied gas on board. Although no one was injured, the explosion risk forced Romanian authorities to evacuate residents of the border village of Plaur.

Monitoring data also shows that between January and September 2025, Russian forces carried out at least 107 attacks on the ports of Big Odesa, ports in southern Odesa region, and on local energy and industrial infrastructure. These included 33 missile strikes, 74 UAV strikes, and two attacks by unmanned surface vessels. On average, one attack every three days.

“Nothing has changed — they’ve been striking the ports every day anyway. Everyone is working as usual: requests are coming in, we’re looking for vessels, freight is moving,” says Kostiantyn Sobol, founder of MB Navigation S.A. He notes, however, that the situation is dynamic and everyone is watching closely.

Kostiantyn Sobol

Founder of MB Navigation S.A.

“Hitting bulk carriers is very risky for the Russians because the same shipowners enter both Ukrainian and Russian ports. These are Chinese, Turkish, Lebanese, Syrian companies — they work in both markets. Attacking them would be shooting themselves in the foot.”

In his view, the biggest risks concern liquid cargo. With the Midvolga-2 incident (a Russian oil tanker that reported being attacked; Ukraine has denied involvement and called it a provocation), Russia created a pretext to shift pressure toward the niche segment of tankers transporting Ukrainian sunflower oil — one of the country's key export commodities. This segment has fewer shipowners from the countries mentioned above, meaning fewer political constraints for attacks.

“The threat to strike commercial vessels belonging to countries that trade with Ukraine and maintain friendly relations with it is a clear signal from Russia,” says port industry expert Yuriy Furtatov.

Yuriy Furtatov

Port industry expert

“Foreign shipowners already send to Ukraine, figuratively speaking, not their best or newest vessels. After this threat, I think they’ll seriously reconsider whether the Russians might target their fleet and later claim those ships were carrying some fictional cargo for Ukraine’s defense industry.”

Russian strikes are a very serious issue — but not the only one affecting the operation of Ukrainian ports, says Yuriy Furtatov. If Russia continues intensifying its attacks on infrastructure, there is a real risk that ports may be forced to halt operations. The main threat is disruptions to electricity supply.

Another long-standing problem for port operators is attacks by combat UAVs. But recently, Russians have somewhat changed their tactics. In recent weeks, Odesa has been operating with constant interruptions, notes Barin Group. One or two Shaheds simply fly over the port, forcing the region's administration to declare air-raid alerts. Each alert means several hours of downtime: with constant stoppages, the average loading/unloading speed drops from the usual 3,000 tons per day to just 500–700 tons.

As a result, a vessel that the company was supposed to unload and load within one week ended up waiting in the port for 20 days — 10 for unloading and another 10 for loading.

In “good times,” the largest terminals could load up to 24,000 tons per day — essentially a handysize in a single day. Now, vessels of that class can take a week to load, says Kostiantyn Sobol.

Another factor is insurance: handysize vessels (except for some Arab shipowners) typically carry war-risk insurance. A week of downtime can accumulate $60,000–70,000 in costs — roughly $1.5–2 per ton for a vessel with a deadweight of 30,000 tons, the broker adds. And the base level of risk begins after the first week of waiting.

Kostiantyn Sobol

Founder of MB Navigation S.A

“Freight rates normally include insurance for the first week of demurrage. Risks for shipowners appear if a vessel remains at berth longer due to air-raid alerts and reduced loading rates.”

Furtatov adds that in late autumn and early winter, long downtimes become unavoidable due to three factors: regular rainfall and fog, frequent air-raid alerts, and a significant decrease in loading speed caused by power shortages.

As a result, because loading schedules shift, more and more vessels accumulate near the ports. After the statements by the Russian president, this becomes an even bigger problem: under wartime conditions, transport assets must be as dispersed as possible, not clustered in or near ports. Given the unpredictability of Russian strikes, no one can know which vessels may become targets — or whether they will be targeted at all. Therefore, Putin’s words may indeed reduce cargo turnover and further complicate operations at Ukrainian ports, Furtatov suggests.

Furtatov is concerned that Russian blackmail could potentially drive up freight rates and the cost of vessel and cargo insurance — similar to what happened in Danube ports in 2022–2023. Such cost increases could “kill” the economics of import and export operations in Odesa’s ports at a time when shippers, consignees, and forwarders are fighting for every cent per ton.

At the same time, port operators cannot simply pass these costs on to other market participants, he notes. Stevedoring companies are heavily discounting right now; many in the industry are working at break-even or even at a loss just to stay in the market. Raising service prices in such conditions is a fast track to bankruptcy. This is why the state and the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority (USPA) must be involved in regulating cargo-handling tariffs. This also aligns with European practice, where the state oversees pricing and tariffs.

For now, Putin’s statements have not affected freight rates or war-risk insurance premiums, clarifies Daria Marchenko, a broker at Atria Brokers. Shipowners have already more or less adapted to current risks. Over the past six weeks, freight rates have remained stable or even decreased by a dollar or two after a sharp rise caused by Russia “pulling” vessels off the market with enormous rates.

Daria Marchenko

Broker at Atria Brokers

“I wouldn’t say we’re seeing any fear among shipowners about entering Ukraine. There’s no panic in the freight market over this statement. The only ones truly concerned right now are traders, because they feel this impact directly.”

She also does not expect drastic changes in transshipment fees. Those who need to move grain have already locked in their rates at terminals, and those terminals are unlikely to revise them in the middle of the export season.

Moreover, attacks on ports, vessels, and infrastructure fall under force-majeure conditions beyond the control of businesses. And if terminals in Big Odesa raise their transshipment fees, this will only push the market to switch to alternatives — Danube ports, coaster vessels, and others. Port stevedores understand this and are in no hurry to lose clients.

Ukraine could theoretically export grain through the Danube and its western borders if Russian strikes intensify and losses in seaports rise sharply, says Andriy But, Director of Foreign Trade at the AGROTRADE Group. Of course, this would hit domestic prices for producers, but exports would continue. Ukrainian growers already experienced a similar situation in 2022.

TG Agro, which cultivates 6,500 hectares in Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions, is currently trucking corn to the port and looking for opportunities to sell on the domestic market, including to feed mills. Western border routes are not being considered for now, says its director, Serhii Voinelovych.

Serhii Voinelovych

Director of TG Agro

“We had that experience in 2022, and we may have to return to it. But for now, we’re not considering it. Exporting through the western borders is practically unprofitable after the current drying costs.”

The Danube ports cannot become a full-fledged solution for Ukraine’s agricultural exports because the river physically cannot handle the required volumes, notes broker and author of the “Grain Broker” Telegram channel, Volodymyr Levkovskyi. When Ukraine tried to reorient exports to the western EU border three years ago, Europe quickly saw farmer and logistics worker protests.

Volodymyr Levkovskyi

Broker

“Our only real export source is deep-water seaports. All other routes are auxiliary; they can cover export needs mostly for large holdings. A regular farmer without direct access to a port will simply wait for their turn for transport — and they also need working capital right now, and storage for their harvest during wartime.”

Danube ports and land-based rail transport also do not guarantee 100% safe logistics, stresses Daria Marchenko. According to her, even multinational traders now believe Ukraine may again return to 2022–2023 realities and export via the Danube or land routes, as seaport capacity remains limited — in some terminals, only one berth out of five is operational.

However, these routes face the same issues as seaports. Danube terminals and rail infrastructure are also attacked by Russian Shaheds, electric trains are delayed due to strikes on railway substations, and grain-hauling trucks are currently in deficit due to high demand.

Having maritime export infrastructure in a country at war is a major advantage, and the situation can change at any moment, notes Levkovskyi. Today, both farmers and traders are working under elevated risks, and amid missile and drone attacks, it is safer to hold cash in a bank account than to store grain in an elevator.

Many agrarians currently do not feel the full extent of the logistical and infrastructural problems, explains Marchenko. As a result, they are not rushing to sell their grain, hoping for further price increases.

Daria Marchenko

Broker at Atria Brokers

“A producer without their own trading arm, and a regular farmer, believes prices will rise and that we will export everything just fine. They hope for the best — that there will be a huge demand or a price spike in February. They hold grain ‘until victory,’ reading analytical reports that tell them everything will be great, and prices won’t drop.”

At HarvEast, the goal is to ship out all grain for export as quickly as possible. As HarvEast CEO Dmytro Skorniakov said in late November, the company is preparing for the possibility that Russians may continue to target railway infrastructure and ports. This could significantly increase logistics costs in the future.

TG Agro also plans to accelerate corn sales following Putin’s statements.

Serhii Voinelovych

Director of TG Agro

“We definitely can’t ignore this. And from January, Ukrainian Railways plans to increase tariffs. So we’re selling corn now. Will we increase sales volumes? Not by much, but I think we’ll speed up a bit. Logistics is difficult and expensive at the moment, but we will still accelerate somewhat.”

According to him, prices are currently higher than last year, allowing profitable sales for those harvesting corn at standard moisture levels.

Meanwhile, several farmers told us they do not intend to change their trading strategy under pressure from Putin’s statements.

Kostiantyn Sobol advises against comparing today’s situation with 2022. Back then, he says, farmers needed to “dump” their grain, but now they are not in a hurry.

Kostiantyn Sobol

Founder of MB Navigation S.A.

“These are more like scare stories from traders, logisticians, and brokers saying you must sell grain right now. Farmers don’t think that way. At the moment, demand exceeds supply.”

However, even if farmers actively start delivering grain to sell, export volumes will not increase quickly, Marchenko notes. Because of Russian strikes across the country, power outages occur everywhere — including at grain elevators. Farmers must dry wet grain, sometimes in two or three cycles, before delivering it to port. But elevators operate only according to electricity outage schedules, so farmers are forced to wait even at the earliest stages of the sales process.

The next stage is problematic as well — rail transport often stalls due to power outages caused by strikes on railway infrastructure. And when the grain finally arrives at the port by rail or truck, it often waits for unloading because air-raid alerts send port workers into shelters.

Putin’s statements have undoubtedly added tension to the market, and risks are growing, agrees Andriy But. Shipowners entering Ukrainian ports will likely demand higher rates and risk premiums. This may ultimately increase logistics costs and lower purchase prices. But is Russia really prepared to intensify strikes on port infrastructure, as the aggressor country claims?

Andriy But

Director of Foreign Trade at the AGROTRADE Group

“I think yes — we are already seeing this in practice. But as for strikes on commercial vessels calling at Ukrainian ports — unlikely. They probably understand that Ukraine would respond as well.”

If Ukraine begins to act more aggressively against Russian tankers in the Black Sea or other regions, such as the Baltic, this would become a far more serious problem for Russia’s exports than any losses Ukraine might suffer from higher logistics costs.

“It’s unlikely anyone can give a fully accurate forecast, but I believe we should not expect mass attacks on commercial fleets. One or two isolated incidents are possible, but not systemic strikes. I’ll repeat: the key issue now is rather the cost of freight and a potential decrease in the supply of vessels — especially among those owners still willing to call at Ukrainian ports.”

Kostiantyn Tkachenko, Oleksii Kozachenko, Nataliia Rodak, Latifundist.com