Four scenarios for Ukraine’s agricultural exports in 2026/27 — ASAP Agri
In its August WASDE report, USDA raised its forecast for Ukraine’s production of key grains and oilseeds to 85.7 MMT. The revision confirms the prospect of a large crop but also raises concerns over Ukraine’s ability to market it, according to Kateryna Mudriian, Lead Grain Market Analyst at ASAP Agri.
ASAP Agri’s updated production estimate is even higher at 86.1 MMT, following an upward revision to the wheat crop forecast.
Export projections, however, are moving in the opposite direction. In its August WASDE, USDA cut its forecast for Ukraine’s exports of key grains and oilseeds by 2.5 MMT to 42.6 MMT.
Ahead of the report, ASAP Agri also lowered its 2026/27 export forecast from 48.6 MMT to 45.8 MMT for the July–June season. The revision reflects weaker shipments in July and an expected decline in exports in August and September.
Ukraine’s Economy Ministry has also become more cautious, reducing its 2026/27 grain export forecast to 38–40 MMT, from 43 MMT previously.
Ukraine is therefore entering the new season with a larger crop but fewer opportunities to ship it abroad. Russian attacks on the Greater Odesa ports have disrupted the country’s main export channel just as new-crop shipments should be accelerating.
If export logistics cannot handle the additional volumes, more supply will remain in the domestic market, increasing pressure on local prices.
The key question for the season is therefore not only how much Ukraine will harvest, but how much of that crop it can export both physically and economically.
Below, we consider four scenarios showing how export volumes could change depending on the availability of the Danube ports and the pace of recovery at the Greater Odesa ports.
*What the calculations include
The scenarios cover six crops: wheat, corn, barley, sunflower seed, rapeseed and soybeans. Vegetable oils, meals and other processed products are excluded.
Ukraine exported around 2.75 MMT of these six crops in July. Future volumes will depend mainly on whether the Danube route remains available and how quickly deep-sea port operations recover.
Scenario 1. Neither Greater Odesa nor the Danube is available
Seasonal exports: 13.8 MMT
This is the most negative scenario. The deep-sea ports of Greater Odesa remain unavailable, while the Danube cannot support stable exports because of low water levels and a combination of infrastructure and security constraints.
Exports would therefore depend almost entirely on rail and road transport. The calculation is based on average monthly volumes between March 2022 and November 2023, when Ukraine exported around 1 MMT per month via these routes: approximately 741 KMT by rail and 265 KMT by road.
Even if Ukraine returned to those rates, seasonal exports would reach only 13.8 MMT — less than one-third of the country’s potential. Storage facilities would fill rapidly in the autumn, while expensive transport to the western borders would weigh on domestic prices.
Corn, wheat and barley exports would face the greatest pressure. These crops are produced in large volumes and have a relatively low value per tonne, making their economics particularly sensitive to logistics costs. Corn would be the most vulnerable, given its large export potential and the arrival of the main crop in the autumn.
Rapeseed and soybeans would be more resilient. Cross-border shipments are already traditional channels for these crops, making them better able to absorb expensive logistics. Sunflower seed would receive some support from domestic processing, although weak exports of sunflower oil and meal would limit processors’ demand.
Scenario 2. Greater Odesa remains unavailable, but the Danube operates
Seasonal exports: 23.6 MMT
In this scenario, the Danube is added to the available rail and road routes.
Average monthly exports rise to around 1.56–2.2 MMT across rail, road and the Danube.
The benchmark remains the 2022–2023 period, when Danube exports were already operating actively. However, returning to those levels would be difficult. Even if the Danube route remains available, more than half of Ukraine’s potential exports could still remain unrealised during the season.
The main constraints would include low water levels at the beginning of the season, reduced vessel and barge loadings, security risks, high transshipment costs and dependence on available capacity in Constanța, where Romanian grain remains the priority.
Corn, wheat and barley exports would remain under pressure. The Danube ports would provide additional capacity but could not handle the entire volume. Rapeseed and soybeans would benefit the most, as their shipments can be distributed more easily across several routes. Nevertheless, the overall market would remain constrained.
Scenario 3. Greater Odesa partially recovers
Seasonal exports: 38.2 MMT
Under the third scenario, shipments through the Danube ports and land routes continue, while the deep-sea ports gradually resume part of their operations.
This is the baseline scenario for a partial recovery of the Greater Odesa ports. The calculation uses the average monthly exports of the six crops through Greater Odesa in 2025/26 — around 3.06 MMT. Given the large crop expected this season, Ukraine would seek to maximise shipments through this route.
The scenario assumes that the ports recover to 30% of this level in September 2026 and operate at 50% from October through the end of the season. Even after this partial recovery, Greater Odesa would therefore handle no more than around 1.5 MMT per month.
Together with the Danube and land routes, this would bring total exports to around 2.5–3.7 MMT per month, allowing Ukraine to ship approximately 38.2 MMT during the full 2026/27 season.
This would noticeably ease pressure on the logistics system, but risks would remain: any new disruption would quickly bring pressure back to the market.
Wheat and barley would benefit the most, regaining access to traditional destination markets. Corn would nevertheless remain at risk, as partially restored port operations may still be insufficient to handle its large export potential. Rapeseed and soybeans would remain more resilient, while sunflower seed would receive support from more stable processing activity.
Scenario 4. Greater Odesa returns to stable operations
Seasonal exports: 45.8 MMT
This is the most positive of the four scenarios. It assumes that the Greater Odesa ports gradually recover to the peak monthly export volume recorded for the six crops in 2025/26 — around 3.8 MMT per month.
Under this scenario, the deep-sea ports would handle 50% of this volume in September 2026, rising to 80% in October and 100% in November. Shipments would then stabilise at an average of around 3.87 MMT per month.
As Greater Odesa recovers, grain shipments by rail and road could return to the levels recorded in 2025/26. Exports through the Danube ports could meanwhile rise compared with the previous season, as exporters would continue to maintain the route as an alternative option.
Together with the Danube ports, rail and road transport, total exports could reach around 4.5 MMT per month. Under this scenario, Ukraine would export 45.8 MMT over the full 2026/27 season, almost fully realising the projected export potential of its grains and oilseeds.
Corn would benefit the most, as stable deep-sea shipments would substantially reduce the risk of stocks accumulating after the autumn harvest, while European demand would provide additional support. Wheat and barley could once again be exported in large vessel parcels to traditional markets. Rapeseed and soybeans would benefit from stronger domestic prices and less competition for land logistics. For sunflower seed, stable port operations would support exports of oil and meal and, consequently, domestic processors’ demand for raw materials.
Stable port operations could mean an additional 32 MMT of exports
The difference between the two extreme scenarios reaches around 32 MMT. The main risk this season is not Ukraine’s ability to harvest a large crop, but the possibility that much of it will remain inside the country.
Following the disruption of deep-sea port operations, the cost of maritime logistics from the Danube rose sharply. As of 13 August, coaster freight from the Danube ports to Egypt had increased by approximately 40 USD/MT within a month. At the same time, transporting grain by rail to the Danube ports is more expensive than delivery to the deep-sea ports, while transshipment costs are also higher.
These additional expenses are ultimately reflected in traders’ purchase prices, shifting most of the financial burden onto producers. As a result, farmers receive lower prices for their grain and lose access to part of the working capital they need for subsequent production.
What will happen to Ukrainian grain prices if Greater Odesa does not resume stable operations?
ASAP Agri monitors grain, oilseed and by-product prices, freight rates, export flows, and port and border operations on a daily basis. Our Premium subscribers receive up-to-date prices, forecasts and scenarios to support their trading decisions.
